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I
n an open macroeconomy, in which asset trade is possible, the portfolio choice of 
households may play an important role in understanding macro fluctuations. In 
contrast to a closed economy model, in which a representative agent simply holds 
the market portfolio, agents in each country may hold different portfolios depending 
on the country-specific risks and returns that they encounter. Robert E. Lucas, Jr. 
(1982) provides a fully optimizing model of portfolio balance in which households 
trade bonds, equities, and claims to monetary transfer from the government. Lucas 
(1982) and subsequent fully worked-out portfolio balance models have assumed 
complete nominal goods price flexibility. However, models with sticky nominal 
goods prices might be appropriate for the consideration of the real consequences of 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations. Indeed, as we show, the equilibrium portfolio 
may depend, in important ways, on short-run goods pricing behavior.
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The International Diversification Puzzle When Goods 
Prices Are Sticky: It’s Really about Exchange-Rate 
Hedging, Not Equity Portfolios
†
By Charles Engel and Akito Matsumoto*
This paper develops a two-country monetary DSGE model in which 
households choose a portfolio of home and foreign equities, and a 
forward position in foreign exchange. Some nominal goods prices 
are sticky. Trade in these assets achieves the same allocations as 
trade in a complete set of nominal state-contingent claims in our 
linearized model. When there is a high degree of price stickiness, we 
show that not much equity diversification is required to replicate the 
complete-markets equilibrium when agents are able to hedge foreign 
exchange  risk  sufficiently.  Moreover,  temporarily  sticky  nominal 
goods prices can have large effects on equity portfolios even when 
dividend processes are very persistent. (JEL E13, F41, G11, G15)156  AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MAcroEconoMicS  JuLY 2009
This paper makes two main contributions.
First, we show that when there is a high degree of nominal goods price sticki-
ness, the availability of a foreign-exchange hedge may play a key role in interna-
tional risk sharing. Specifically, we consider a model in which agents can trade 
equity shares and a forward position in foreign exchange. There are real productiv-
ity shocks and nominal monetary shocks in our model. With this limited menu of 
assets, the equilibrium mimics the complete markets outcome—real allocations 
are the same as if a complete set of nominal contingent claims were traded. But the 
portfolios that optimally spread risk may not exhibit much equity diversification. 
If agents can diversify against risk arising from nominal exchange rate fluctua-
tions, with sufficient nominal price stickiness, diversification in the equity port-
folio need be minimal. That is, equilibrium portfolios might exhibit home bias. 
The basic notion is that the shocks that affect relative consumption risk across 
countries operate through their effects on relative prices (the real exchange rate 
and the terms of trade) when equity portfolios are not diversified. In the short run, 
when nominal goods prices are sticky, much of that risk can be hedged on forward 
foreign exchange markets.
In a sense, we have recast the international portfolio diversification puzzle. If 
goods prices are sticky, we argue that it is not the equity portfolio that bears most 
of the burden of risk sharing, but, rather, the foreign exchange position. The optimal 
exchange-rate hedge requires that agents go long in their own currency and short in 
foreign currency. The real puzzle about international diversification may turn out 
to be about the foreign exchange denomination of nominal assets in international 
portfolios rather than the composition of the equity portfolio.
1
Second, it might seem that price stickiness should be a minor consideration for 
asset demands. The value of an asset is determined by the expected present dis-
counted value of its current and future payouts. Since persistent productivity shocks 
drive the real payoffs of assets, price stickiness should have only a small effect on 
the expected present value. One of the central insights of this paper is that transitory 
price stickiness can have a large impact on international asset choice. It draws on 
the observation that, under flexible goods prices, terms-of-trade changes can provide 
substantial insurance for productivity shocks, even in the absence of trade in assets. 
For example, a negative domestic productivity shock reduces the supply of home 
goods, but the effects of this shock on home income can be offset, to some extent, 
by an increase in the relative price of exports. If prices are flexible, portfolio diversi-
fication may not increase expected utility much because of the automatic risk diver-
sification from the terms-of-trade adjustment. However, the risks encountered under 
sticky prices cannot be insured by terms-of-trade movements. While these risks may 
be only transitory, they might have a dominant role in portfolio choice because the 
portfolio is the only means of insuring against these shocks. When prices are sticky, 
the mix of home and foreign equities can differ dramatically from the mix under 
flexible prices, even when prices adjust relatively rapidly.
1 We say “may” because, in fact, little is known about the actual foreign exchange denomination of nominal 
assets, especially because information on derivative holdings is scarce.VoL. 1 no. 2  157 EnGEL AnD MATSuMoTo: ThE inTErnATionAL DiVErSificATion puzzLE
Empirical studies have found that foreign equities comprise a small proportion of 
investors’ portfolios.
2 This finding is puzzling because it appears that investors are 
forgoing important opportunities for diversification of risk.
3 While there have been 
many suggested resolutions to the puzzle, none seem able to explain entirely the 
extent of home bias. Our results show that if agents take an optimal exchange-rate 
hedge, equity portfolio diversification might not be important. But this conclusion 
requires that agents fully hedge foreign exchange risk.
Our model is related to one thread of the literature that has attempted to explain 
home bias as a hedge against nontradable risks.
4 That literature points out that if 
nontraded labor income is negatively correlated with returns to domestic equities, 
then domestic equities serve as a hedge for labor income. That hedging incentive 
leads to home bias in equity portfolios. There is considerable dispute over whether 
this could explain home bias. In neoclassical models, because labor income is cor-
related more with domestic firms’ profits than with foreign firms’ profits, the opti-
mal portfolio will be more foreign-weighted than the classical endowment model 
predicts, as shown in Baxter and Jermann (1997). There have been some attempts 
to generalize the neoclassical model to generate this negative covariance of returns 
to human capital and domestic equities.
5 The empirical evidence on this correlation 
is mixed.
6
When an exchange-rate hedge is available, it is not the unconditional correlation 
between relative equity returns and returns to human capital that is important for 
equity choice. What matters is the correlation conditioning on the nominal exchange 
rate, when nominal goods prices are sticky. We develop a model in which the uncon-
ditional correlation between the return to human capital, and the return to domestic 
equities relative to foreign equities, could be positive, but may be negative, condi-
tional on the nominal exchange rate.
In the past few years, there have been many new dynamic models of portfolio 
choice in general equilibrium. Particularly relevant are the studies that use approxi-
mation methods, similar to those used in this paper, to analyze the dynamics of 
portfolios. In particular, several recent papers have developed, generalized, and 
formalized the approximation method that we introduced in this paper. Michael 
B. Devereux and Alan Sutherland (2006) derive an approximation method for an 
2 Kenneth R. French and James M. Poterba (1991); Linda L. Tesar and Ingrid M. Werner (1995); and Francis 
E. Warnock (2002), for example.
3 Karen K. Lewis (1999, 2000) surveys the literature on this puzzle and discusses the losses from non-
diversification.
4 On the role of nontraded goods, see Rafael Eldor, David Pines, and Abba Schwartz (1988); Alan C. Stockman 
and Harris Dellas (1989); Tesar (1993); Marianne Baxter, Urban J. Jermann, and Robert G. King (1998); and Paolo 
Pesenti and Eric van Wincoop (2002).
5 Ignacio Palacios-Huerta (2001) claims that a substantial fraction of home bias can be explained when the dif-
ferential human capital of stockholders and nonstockholders is taken into account along with human capital fric-
tions. Jonathan Heathcote and Fabrizio Perri (2008) show that in a two-good model with investment there may be 
home bias in an neoclassical setting. Nicolas Coeurdacier, Robert Kollmann, and Philippe Martin (forthcoming) 
introduce ad hoc “redistributive shocks” in order to generate negative correlation between labor income and prof-
its in a neoclassical model. See also Jermann (2002), Christian Julliard (2004), and Akito Matsumoto (2007).
6 Baxter and Jermann (1997) produce evidence that the covariance is positive. Laura Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van 
Wincoop (1996), and Julliard (2002), produce evidence to suggest that outside the United States there is a weak 
negative correlation between returns to human capital and domestic equities. See Hanno Lustig and Stijn van 
Nieuwerburgh (2008) for evidence that returns to human wealth are negatively related to returns to firm owners.158  AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MAcroEconoMicS  JuLY 2009
economy with incomplete markets but constant portfolio shares, and apply it to a 
two-country general equilibrium model with production and trade in equities, and to 
a two-country endowment model with trade in real bonds. Devereux and Sutherland 
(2008a) apply this model to a sticky-price monetary model that allows for portfolios 
of bonds and equity trade. Devereux and Sutherland (2007) extend the approximation 
method to allow for time-varying portfolios, and apply the method to a two-country 
endowment model with trade in real bonds. Devereux and Sutherland (2008b) exam-
ine a similar model, with a focus on the role of changes in valuation for the interna-
tional distribution of wealth. Cedric Tille and van Wincoop (2008a) use a similar 
approximation to solve a two-country general equilibrium model with capital and 
production and trade in equities. Tille and van Wincoop (2008b) use these methods 
to examine the response of the current account and net foreign assets to changes in 
saving. Also, Martin D. D. Evans and Viktoria Hnatkovska (2008) examine a similar 
model with a related solution methodology. Our paper does not require the general-
ized approach to approximating the models introduced in these papers because we 
examine a model in which the menu of assets introduced leads to a complete-mar-
kets allocation (to a first-order approximation) with constant portfolios.
In the following sections, we present two kinds of models. The first is static. It is 
much easier to understand the economic forces at work in the relatively simple static 
model, but the intuition at which we arrive carries over to the second model, which 
is a more realistic dynamic one.
I.  A General Result in a Static Framework
In this section, we present a simple model to illustrate the key mechanism under-
lying our claim that, when nominal prices are sticky, trade in a foreign exchange 
hedge can carry much of the burden of international risk diversification. The idea 
builds from a more general point, which is that, except in some special cases, coun-
try risk is reflected in fluctuations in international relative prices—real exchange 
rates and the terms of trade. If agents can trade assets that hedge these risks, then 
international trade in equities may not be important (and, in the special case of the 
model presented in this section, is redundant). This analysis extends ideas first pre-
sented in Harold L. Cole and Maurice Obstfeld (1991).
To consider international risk sharing, we simplify the internal economy to have 
a representative household/investor, and look at a two-country world. Call these 
two countries Home and Foreign. Suppose that goods produced in one country are 
imperfect substitutes for goods produced in the other country. If there is a stable 
demand function for these goods (not subject to preference shocks), then aggregate 
demand for one country’s goods relative to the other country’s goods will depend 
only on the relative prices of Home/Foreign goods in each country, and the con-
sumption real exchange rate. This conclusion, as we will see shortly, follows from a 
first-order approximation to demand functions assuming homothetic preferences.
What is the bearing of this insight on the question of international portfolio 
choice? Suppose there is no international trade in equities, so households own their 
own country’s equities and no foreign equities. In that case, household income is tied 
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labor income and profits is irrelevant, since all revenues accrue to the same repre-
sentative household. If revenues of Home firms relative to Foreign firms are related 
to relative prices, then Home relative to Foreign income will be as well. Instruments 
that allow hedging relative prices will then hedge relative income. This conclusion 
requires that Home and Foreign goods not be perfect substitutes, because, in that 
special case, Home relative to Foreign revenues will not depend on relative prices.
We build a general-equilibrium, two-country model with sticky prices to show 
how a nominal exchange-rate hedge can diversify all Home relative to Foreign risk 
in a static setting. The world population is normalized to unity; half the population 
lives in Home and half in Foreign. Outcomes are uncertain initially. We assume that 
goods prices must be set prior to the realization of the state. There is also initial asset 
trade that allows Home and Foreign households to hedge risk.
In Section II, we fully specify a general equilibrium model, a model which we 
extend to the dynamic setting in Section III. But, here, we use only some of the 
features of the model (demand functions for goods, market-clearing conditions, and 
a general assumption about nominal price stickiness) to demonstrate that a foreign 
exchange hedge allows households to diversify risk fully in the static setting.
In the models we consider, there is no physical capital. Firms have value because 
they are monopolistic. Each firm produces a unique good and earns monopoly profit. 
Households are endowed with ownership in firms in their own country, and with 
human capital. But, here, we will consider the case in which equities are not trad-
able. We will posit that trade in other assets, such as a forward position in foreign 
exchange, takes place prior to the realization of the state. Under this assumption, any 
portfolio will have a net worth of zero ex ante.
The ex post budget constraint of a representative Home household can be written 
in log-linearized form as
(1)  pt + ct = ζ  ht + (1 − ζ)  πt + κt .
In the models we consider, preferences are homothetic. ct is the log of aggregate 
consumption, and pt is the log of the consumer price index.
7 ht denotes the log of 
total nominal labor income earned by households. κt is the log of the nominal payoff 
from assets acquired before shocks are realized. Throughout, we suppress constant 
terms in the log linearization. ζ is human capital’s share of wealth at the point of 
linearization. There is an analogous budget constraint for foreign households. As we 
shall see, the division of income between profits and returns to labor is irrelevant for 
our conclusions.
Under homothetic preferences, log aggregate consumption can be written as a 
function of consumption of an aggregate of Home goods and an aggregate of Foreign 
goods.
(2)  ct =   
1 + α
  _____  2     ch,t +   1 − α  _____  2     cf,t ,  0 ≤ α < 1.
7 We use a t subscript, even in the static model, for two reasons. First, it allows for easy comparison to the 
dynamic model of Section III. Second, constant terms—terms that do not vary with the state—are distinguished 
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Here, (1 + α)/2 is the share of Home goods in nominal expenditures (at the point 
of approximation). When α > 0, there is home bias in consumption. Because the 
countries are of equal size, if preferences of Home and Foreign households were 
identical, consumption shares would equal ½. The Foreign household’s consumption 
is given by
(3)   c  t  *   =    1 − α  _____  2       c  h,t   *    +    1 + α  _____  2      c  f,t   *    .
Throughout, the * superscript pertains to variables related to Foreign households. 
The log of the consumer price indexes for Home and Foreign households are given 
by
(4)  pt =    1 + α  _____  2     ph,t +    1 − α  _____  2     pf,t , and
(5)   p  t  *   =    1 − α  _____  2       p  h,t   *    +    1 + α  _____  2       p  f,t   *   , respectively.
ph,t and pf,t are the logs of price indexes, in Home currency, for Home consumption 
of the aggregates of Home and Foreign goods, respectively.   p  h,t   *    and   p  f,t   *    are defined 
analogously, and are expressed in Foreign currency terms.
8
Denote the elasticity of substitution between the aggregates of Home and Foreign 
goods (at the point of approximation) by ω. We will assume that elasticity is the same 
for both Home and Foreign households. Then, for example, (log) nominal demand 
for Home goods by Home households is given by ph,t + ch,t = (1 − ω)(ph,t − pt) + 
pt + ct    . Analogous equations hold for Home demand for the Foreign aggregate, and 
for Foreign demand for each aggregate.
In equilibrium, the total nominal demand for Home goods must equal the nomi-
nal revenue of Home firms. Nominal revenue for Home firms equals ζht + (1 − ζ)πt 
(because profits are defined as revenues less labor costs). Demand for Home goods 
comes from Home and Foreign households. Therefore, we can rewrite the budget 
constraint (1) as
(6)  pt + ct =    1 + α  _____  2     [(1 − ω)( ph,t − pt) + pt + ct]
  +    1 − α  _____  2     [(1 − ω)(    p  h,t   *    −   p  t  *  ) + st +   p  t  *   +   c  t  *  ] + κt .
8 The model presented here assumes a symmetric home bias in consumption. However, our results do not 
depend on this assumption. The key point is that we linearize around a deterministic equilibrium with bal-
anced trade, so Home expenditure on Foreign goods equals Foreign expenditure on Home goods at the point of 
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The first term on the right-hand side of this equation represents total demand 
for Home goods from Home households, and the second term is demand for Home 
goods from Foreign households. Demand is expressed in nominal terms. Foreign 
demand is converted into Home currency using the spot exchange rate. st is the log of 
the Home currency price of Foreign currency. The analogous condition for Foreign 
households, in terms of Foreign currency, is symmetric:
(7)   p  t  *   +   c  t  *   =    1 + α  _____  2     [(1 − ω)(    p  f,t   *    −   p  t  *  ) +   p  t  *   +   c  t  *  ]
  +    1 − α  _____  2     [(1 − ω)(  pf,t − pt) − st + pt + ct ] +   κ  t  *   .
As noted previously, ex ante portfolios have zero net worth. Short positions are 
balanced by long positions: κt +   κ  t  *   = 0, which can be verified by adding equa-
tions (6) and (7) and using the definitions of the price indexes, (4) and (5). It fol-
lows that payoffs from these portfolios have a zero sum across Home and Foreign 
households.
We can get relative Home to Foreign consumption by rearranging equations (4), 
(5), and (6):
(8)  ct −   c  t  *   = st +   p  t  *   − pt +     
(1 + α)(ω − 1)
  ____________  2     (  pf,t − ph,t +   p  f,t   *    −   p  h,t   *   ) +     2  _____  1 − α   κt .
Equation (8) shows that relative consumption depends on the real exchange rate, 
st +   p  t  *   − pt, the relative price of Foreign to Home goods in each country, and the 
asset payoffs. The real exchange rate is a function of the deviations from the law 
of one price for each good, st +   p  f,t   *    − pf,t and st +   p  h,t   *    − ph,t , and the relative price 
of Foreign to Home goods in each country. We could say that relative consumption 
depends on the deviations from the law of one price, and relative prices within 
each country, and the asset payoffs. This demonstrates the important point that 
when households hold their equity endowment and cannot trade shares, relative 
consumption risk is transmitted through goods prices in equilibrium.
We do not measure relative risk strictly by looking at ct −   c  t   *  . For one thing, 
since Home and Foreign households consume different baskets, relative aggregate 
consumption may move over time, even if consumption of each type of goods is 
perfectly correlated across Home and Foreign households. In addition, Home and 
Foreign households may pay different prices for the same goods, so it may not be 
optimal for their consumption of each good to be perfectly correlated. Instead, as 
is well understood in the literature, optimal allocation equates the marginal utility 
of a “dollar” spent by Home households (−ρct − pt) with the marginal utility of a 
“dollar” spent by Foreign households (−ρ  c  t   *   − st −   p  t   *  ), where we use the term 
“dollar” to denote a unit of Home’s currency. Here, ρ is the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion, evaluated at the point of linearization (where we are assuming utility 
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from efficient risk sharing by ct −   c  t   *   − (st +   p  t   *   − pt)/ρ. But it still follows that 
these deviations depend only on the real exchange rate and relative goods prices:
(9)  ct −   c  t  *   − Q  1  __  ρ    R (st +   p  t  *   − pt)
  = Q1 −    1  __  ρ    R (st +   p  t  *   − pt) +     
(1 + α)(ω − 1)
  ____________  2     (  pf,t − ph,t +   p  f,t   *    −   p  h,t   *   )
 +      2  _____  1 − α   κt .
When asset markets are complete   (that is, when households can ex ante trade a 
complete set of nominal contingent claims) the equilibrium condition, (−ρct − pt   
= −ρ  c  t  *   − st −   p  t  *  ), can be rearranged as
(10)  ct −   c  t  *   −    1  __  ρ     (st +   p  t  *   − pt) = 0.
In the special case of purchasing power parity (PPP) (st +   p  t  *   − pt = 0), the condition 
implies equality of home and foreign consumption levels.
9 Equation (10) has been 
shown to be an equilibrium condition, under complete markets, in a wide variety of 
circumstances in which PPP does not hold: when there are nontraded goods, when 
consumption baskets are not identical, and when the law of one price is violated 
internationally.
Inspection of equation (9) shows that the complete markets allocation can be 
achieved if the payoffs from the assets are equal to
(11)  κt =    α − 1  _____  2     ca 1 −    1  __  ρ    b (st +   p  t  *   − pt )
  +     
(1 + α)(ω − 1)
  ____________  2     (  pf,t − ph,t +   p  f,t   *    −   p  h,t   *   )d .
As in the Lucas (1982) model, households do not need to trade contingent claims 
to get these payoffs. For example, Home and Foreign households could trade assets 
ex ante whose payoffs were linear in the real exchange rate, st +   p  t  *   − pt , relative 
prices in Home, pf,t − ph,t , and relative prices in Foreign,   p  f,t   *    −   p  h,t   *   . By taking the 
appropriate forward position in these hedges, Home households could get the asset 
payoff (11). By symmetry, Foreign households receive −κt. This portfolio allocation 
achieves optimal risk sharing, but foregoes trade in equities.
Many models assume the law of one price holds. In that case, pf,t − ph,t =  p  f,t   *   −  p  h,t   *   , 
and st +   p  t  *   − pt = α(  pf,t − ph,t). Equation (11) reduces to
(12)  κt =    α − 1  _____  2     ca 1 −    1  __  ρ    b α + (1 + α)(ω − 1)d(  pf,t − ph,t).
9 Our two countries are symmetric ex ante, so they have equal ex ante wealth. In general, when PPP holds, 
consumption levels are equal, up to a constant multiple, across all states, under complete markets.VoL. 1 no. 2  163 EnGEL AnD MATSuMoTo: ThE inTErnATionAL DiVErSificATion puzzLE
In that type of model, full risk sharing could be achieved by trading only an instru-
ment that hedges the terms of trade, pf,t − ph,t .
Realistically, there are failures of the law of one price. Moreover, markets are 
not available to hedge terms of trade or even real exchange rate risk explicitly. But 
when prices are sticky, the log of the real exchange rate and log of the terms of trade 
in each country are linear in the log of the nominal exchange rate. Households can 
achieve complete risk sharing with only trade in an exchange-rate hedge. Forward 
markets for foreign exchange do exist. Moreover, a synthetic forward position can be 
obtained by trading nominal bonds, or with swaps.
This conclusion holds as long as all nominal prices are set ex ante. However, it 
does not depend on the currency of price setting. Prices could all be set in the pro-
ducer’s currency (PCP). Or, prices facing consumers might be set ex ante in the local 
currency (LCP). Or, we might even have prices indexed to the exchange rate, as in 
Giancarlo Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) or Engel (2006).
We assume ph,t = 0, and   p  f,t   *    = 0. These assumptions mean that the Home-currency 
price of home goods sold in the Home currency, and the Foreign-  currency price of 
Foreign goods sold in the Foreign country are constant (independent of shocks) and 
normalized to one (in levels). We can assume partial pass-through for traded prices; 
pf,t = bst ,   p  h,t   *    = −bst , 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. b is the degree of indexing of consumer prices of 
imported goods to exchange rates. LCP corresponds to b = 0, and PCP corresponds 
to b = 1.
Under these assumptions, st +   p  t  *   − pt = [1 − b(1 − α)]st , and pf,t − ph,t +   p  f,t   *    −   p  h,t   *    
= 2bst. Substitute into equation (11) to get
(13)  κt = δst,  δ =    α − 1  _____  2     ea 1 −    1  __  ρ    b [1 − b(1 − α)] + (1 + α)(ω − 1)bf.
If Home and Foreign agents can take a forward position in foreign exchange, they 
can achieve the complete-markets allocation. No trade in equities is required. A for-
ward contract costs one unit of the Home currency. Under our assumptions of sym-
metry, we can normalize the forward price of foreign exchange to be unity, so the log 
of the forward rate is zero. If Home households purchase δ units of this hedge, they 
will achieve the payoff given in (13).
We have reached a dramatic conclusion. Complete hedging can be achieved without 
trade in equities. It is useful to review what we have assumed and what we have not 
assumed. We have assumed a one-period horizon, and that all nominal goods prices 
are fixed ex ante. These two assumptions are critical to the result. When goods prices 
can adjust, the nominal exchange rate cannot generally hedge relative price and real 
exchange rate risk. We will move on to an infinite-horizon model with price adjust-
ment in Section III. There, trade in equities is necessary to replicate the complete 
markets equilibrium, and the equilibrium portfolio will not exhibit complete home 
bias. But we argue that there may be substantial home bias when a nominal exchange 
rate hedge is available. We have made other assumptions, such as the absence of physi-
cal capital, that are also crucial, and that we will not generalize in Section III. Indeed, 
the model we lay out explicitly in Sections II and III specializes the above model by 
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The result we have obtained holds, as we have shown, whether price stickiness 
is of the PCP, LCP, or indexing form. We also have made no assumptions about 
labor markets. There could be a spot market in labor, with flexible wages, or house-
holds could have market power in labor markets, and nominal wages could be sticky. 
There could be bargaining between households and firms over revenues. We have 
not specified, at this stage, how revenues are split between firm owners and workers 
when there is no trade in equities.
We also have not specified the sources of shocks to the system. There can be real 
productivity shocks and nominal monetary shocks. These shocks could influence all 
of the variables in the system: exchange rates, labor income, profits, consumption, 
etc. It is important that we have assumed no preference shocks. If there were shocks 
that changed preferences for Home relative to Foreign goods, we would not be able 
to write relative revenues of Home/Foreign firms as a function only of relative prices 
and total expenditure. Homotheticity is also necessary for our results.
To  restate  our  conclusion,  when  households  in  each  country  have  complete 
ownership of their own firms (100 percent home bias in equity holdings), relative 
  consumption risk is translated through relative prices. When there is full-price stick-
iness, the relative prices adjust only with changes in the nominal exchange rate. So, 
a forward position in foreign exchange can fully hedge risk.
But equation (10) presents a puzzle. When ρ > 1, given our restrictions on param-
eters, we must have δ ≤ 0. That is, the optimal Foreign exchange hedge requires that 
Home agents are short in Foreign currency and long in Home currency, so that a Home 
appreciation (a decrease in st) has a positive payoff. It is well known that relationship 
(10) does not hold in the data. We do not see a strong positive correlation between 
Home relative to Foreign consumption and the real exchange rate. Our model suggests 
that it is because countries have not taken a sufficiently long net Foreign exchange 
position, not because their equity portfolios are insufficiently diversified.
Next, we fully specify a general equilibrium model in a static setting.
II.  A Simple Equilibrium Static Model
In this section, we fully specify a static model that is a special case of the gen-
eral (but not fully specified) model considered in Section I. There are two purposes 
for this section. First, the specification of the model is essentially the same as the 
dynamic model considered in Section III, but the economic forces are, perhaps, 
easier to understand. It serves as a bridge between Sections I and III. In particular, 
we are explicit about the microeconomic foundations of the model. We derive asset 
demands from first-order conditions and derive the equilibrium, and, we are explicit 
about the sources of shocks. Second, we derive asset demand equations that are 
familiar in the static setting—asset demands depend on variances and covariances 
of returns—but we interpret the moments in general equilibrium in terms of the 
underlying second moments of the shocks to the economy. This allows a different 
perspective on the conclusion that all international relative risk can be hedged with 
a forward position in foreign exchange.
In our model, households provide labor and own equity in firms. Firms use labor 
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consumers’ currency. Markets are segmented so that only firms can export goods. 
All goods are tradable and perishable. We assume that, before the realization of 
shocks, only forward contracts in the foreign exchange and equities are traded.
We assume local currency pricing of goods. We observe in the data, at least for 
developed countries, that consumer prices are sticky in the consumers’ currencies 
rather than in the producers’ currencies. However, the assumption of currency of 
pricing is not important in determining the equity portfolio. In fact, we would have 
exactly the same equity portfolio when prices are preset in producers’ currencies, 
even though the equilibrium number of forward contracts differs.
10
We consider two kinds of shocks: monetary and technology shocks (which may 
be correlated). The distribution of shocks is identical in Home and Foreign. The 
technical details of the model are laid out in Sections IIA and IIB. Section IIC 
derives the optimal portfolios and provides interpretation.
A. households
Households in both countries have identical preferences over the consumption 
basket, the real money of the domestic country, and leisure. There are two stages 
to the household decision problem. In the first stage, households choose a portfolio 
position: shares of Home equities (γh), shares of Foreign equities (γf ), and a forward 
position in foreign exchange (  ˜ 
  
  δ  ). These are chosen before the resolution of uncer-
tainty. After shocks are realized, households choose consumption, labor supply, and 
money balances to maximize
(14)  uact ,    
Mt  ___  pt
    , Ltb =    1  _____  1 − ρ       c  t  
1−ρ   + χ ln a   
Mt  ___  pt
   b −    
η
  _____  1 + ψ       L  t  
1+ψ  ,
 ρ  > 0, χ >0, ψ ≥ 0, and η > 0
subject to the constraint
(15)  ptct + Mt = γh Πt + γf St   Π  t  *   + Wt  Lt +    ˜ 
  
  δ   (St − ft) + Trt .
ct denotes the consumption basket for Home; Mt denotes Home money; pt , the price 
index; and L t , the labor supply. ct is a consumption basket of a representative Home 
household defined as
(16)  ct ≡ a    1  __  2   b  
1/(ω−1)
   (  c  h,t  
(ω−1)/ω   +   c  f,t  
(ω−1)/ω   )  
ω/(ω−1)  ,
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where ω > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between Home produced goods and 
Foreign produced goods. ch,t is the consumption basket of Home produced goods 
and cf,t is that of Foreign produced goods:
(17)  ch,t ≡ c2
1/λ   ∫ 
0
   
1/2
   ch,t (i)
(λ−1)/λ di  d  
λ/(λ−1)
  , cf,t ≡  c2
1/λ   ∫ 
1/2
  
1
       cf,t (i)
(λ−1)/λ di  d  
λ/(λ−1)
 ,
where λ denotes the elasticity of substitution among varieties, with λ > 1. We can 
write the CPI as follows:
(18)  pt ≡ a    1  __  2   b  
1/(1−ω)
   (  p  h,t  
1−ω   +   p  f,t  
1−ω  )
1/(1−ω),
where
(19)  ph,t ≡ c2   ∫ 
0
   
1/2
       ph,t(i)
1−λ di  d  
1/(1−λ)
  ,  pf,t ≡ c2   ∫ 
1/2
  
1
        pf,t(i)
1−λ di  d  
1/(1−λ)
 ,
where ph,t(i) is the price of Home goods i sold at Home in terms of the Home cur-
rency, and pf,t(i) is the price of Foreign goods i sold at Home in terms of the Home 
currency.
Home households receive the following: wages (Wt Lt , where Wt denotes the wage), 
dividends, transfers from the government (Trt), and the gains or losses from forward 
contracts. Equity dividends received by a Home household are given by
 γ hΠt + γf  St    Π  t  * ,
where Πt is the profit (dividend) of Home firms, and   Π  t  *   is that of Foreign firms in 
terms of the Foreign currency.
11 St is the Home currency price of Foreign currency. 
Home and Foreign households trade forward contracts in the Foreign exchange. The 
forward rate, ft , is known at the time the forward contract is entered into, prior to the 
realization of shocks. After the shocks are realized, the Home households receive   
  ˜ 
  
  δ  (St − ft) units of Home currency.
Foreign households have an analogous utility function for Foreign quantities and 
prices, which we will denote by superscript asterisks. Foreign prices are denomi-
nated in Foreign currency.
Prior to the realization of shocks, the households choose the portfolio position to 
maximize expected utility (Et−1u(ct , Mt/pt , Lt)),
12 subject to the constraint
(20)  γh + γf = 1.
Note that there is no constraint on the forward position,    ˜ 
  
  δ  . We assume that the ex 
ante distribution of shocks is identical between Home and Foreign. This assumption, 
11 Theoretically, profits can be negative in the case of a loss, but we have to assume that the profits of both 
Home firms and Foreign firms are positive to take logarithms.
12 We use the notation that expectations are taken at time t − 1 in this section, even though the model is static, 
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together with the assumptions of identical size and identical preferences, gives us an 
equilibrium in which the equity prices of Home and Foreign firms are the same prior 
to the realization of shocks.
13 In our normalization, the representative household of 
each country is endowed with an ownership share of one of their own firms, but they 
may trade some of their shares with households in the other country, which implies 
constraint (20). Given the symmetry in the model, there is home bias in equity hold-
ings when γf  < ½.
Given prices and the total consumption basket, ct , the optimal consumption allo-
cations are
(21)  ch,t =    1  __  2    a   
ph,t  ___  pt
    b  
−ω
  ct ,  cf,t =    1  __  2    a   
pf,t  ___  pt
    b  
−ω
  ct ,
(22)  ch,t(i) = 2a   
ph,t(i)
  _____  ph,t
    b  
−λ
  ch,t ,  cf,t(i) = 2a   
pf,t(i)
  _____  pf,t
    b  
−λ
  cf,t .
The remaining first-order conditions are
(23)    
Mt  ___  pt
    = χ  c  t  
ρ ,
(24)  Wt =    
η
  __  χ     Mt    L  t  
ψ ,
(25)  Et−1 aSt    
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
   b = ft Et−1 a   
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
   b ,
(26)  Et−1 aΠt    
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
   b = Et−1 aSt   Π  t  *      
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
   b.
B. firms
Firms  engage  in  monopolistic  competition  as  in  Olivier  Jean  Blanchard  and 
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (1987). A firm in this economy monopolistically produces a spe-
cific good indexed by i using a linear technology:
14
(27)  Yt(i) = At Lt(i),
13 If prices are different, then one country is richer than the other ex ante, a situation that contradicts 
symmetry.
14 Using a Cobb-Douglas technology with other fixed inputs will not change the result if the returns on the 
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where Yt(i) is the production of firm i, At is the country-specific technology param-
eter, and Lt(i) is the labor input of firm i. Labor is assumed to be homogeneous, 
and to be supplied elastically. Home and Foreign markets are segmented, and only 
the producer can distribute its product. Firms set prices one period in advance in 
the consumers’ currencies for each country. Firms in each country set prices so as 
to maximize their expected profits, taking other firms’ prices as given, which is 
equivalent to taking the price level as given since each firm has measure zero on 
interval [0, 1].
Given the CES utility subfunction, the demand for Home good i from the Home 
market denoted by Yh,t(i) is
(28)  Yh,t(i) = a   
ph,t(i)
  _____  ph,t
    b  
−λ
   a   
ph,t  ___  pt
    b  
−ω
  ct ,
while the demand for Home good i from the Foreign market is
(29)  Yh,t(i)* = a   
  p  h,t   *   (i)
  _____ 
  p  h,t   *  
    b  
−λ
   a   
  p  h,t   *  
  ___ 
  p  t  * 
    b  
−ω
  c  t  * .
Firm i’s profit maximization problem is
     m a x      
ph,t(i),   p  h,t   *   (i)
   Et−1 e    ˜ 
   
  D  t (i) cph,t(i)Yh,t(i) + St   p  h,t   *   (i)  Y  h,t   *   (i) −    
Wt  ___  At
    (Yh,t(i) +   Y  h,t   *   (i))df,
where    ˜ 
   
  D  t (i) is the stochastic discount factor for the firm i. For example, if firms are 
owned by Home residents, it will be   c  t  
−ρ  /pt . However, because firms are not always 
domestically owned, we use a more general notation.
The optimal price of Home goods for the Home market is
15
(30)  ph,t =     λ  _____  λ − 1       
Et−1 a    ˜ 
   
  D  t ct    
Wt  ___  At
   b
  ___________  
Et−1 (   ˜ 
   
  D  t ct)
   .
Similarly, the optimal price of Home goods for the Foreign market is
(31)   p  h,t   *    =     λ  _____  λ − 1       
Et−1 a    ˜ 
   
  D  t  c  t  *     Wt  ___ 
At
   b
  ___________  
Et−1 (   ˜ 
   
  D  t  c  t  *  St  )
  .
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Because firms are all alike, they will set the identical prices for each market.
The market clearing condition can be obtained by equating the output with the 
sum of the demands for Home goods:
(32)  At  Lt =    1  __  2    a   
ph,t  ___  pt
      b  
−ω
  ct +    1  __  2    a   
  p  h,t   *  
  ___ 
  p  t  * 
    b  
−ω
  c  t  * .
Given these prices, we can calculate profits. Using the optimal consumption allo-
cations, we can write the profits for the firms in each country in terms of the Home 
currency as
(33)  Πt =    1  __  2    ph,t a   
ph,t  ___  pt 
    b  
−ω
  ct +    1  __  2    St   p  h,t   *    a   
  p  h,t   *  
  ___ 
  p  t  * 
    b  
−ω
  c  t  *   − Wt  L t ,
(34)  St   Π  t  *   =    1  __  2    St   p  f,t   *    a   
  p  f,t   *  
  ___ 
  p  t  * 
   b  
−ω
  c  t  *   +    1  __  2    pf,t a   
pf,t  ___  pt
    b  
−ω
  ct − St  W  t   *  L  t  * .
Firms will pay out all of their profits as dividends.
We assume that At and   A  t  *   are drawn from identical lognormal distributions with 
vart−1 (ln(At)) = vart−1(ln(  A  t  *  )) =   σ  a  
2  , and covt−1 (ln At, ln   A  t  *  ) = σa,a* . We also assume 
that Mt and   M  t  *   are drawn from identical lognormal distributions with vart−1(ln (Mt)) 
= vart−1 (ln(  M  t  *  )) =   σ  m  
2
   , and covt−1(ln Mt, ln   M  t  *  ) = σm,m* . We allow for correlation 
between monetary and technology shocks, as long as it is not perfect correlation.
The labor market is competitive, and the wage moves freely to equate demand and 
supply of labor after the shocks. The output of each good is determined by demand. 
Firms adjust output after the shocks to satisfy demand, holding prices constant. The 
money market is assumed to equilibrate, so money demand equals money supply.
C. Solution of the Static Model
An equilibrium in the static model satisfies equations (15) and (18)–(34), and 
their foreign counterparts. These 39 equations (one is redundant by Walras’ Law) 
solve for ct , ch,t , cf,t , ch,t (i), cf,t(i), Lt , Wt , pt , ph,t , pf,t , ph,t(i),   p  h,t  
*
   (i), Yt(i), Yh,t(i), 
Y 
*
h, t(i), Πt , γh , γf , and their foreign counterparts, and    ˜ 
  
  δ  , ft , and St.
16
We  will  not,  in  fact,  solve  for  this  equilibrium,  but  will,  instead,  solve  the 
equilibrium for a set of equations that approximate these 39. We take first-order 
approximations to the budget constraint (15), the definitions of the consumption and 
price indexes (16)–(19), the equilibrium condition (32), and the definition of profits 
(33)–(34). Under our assumption that the driving variables are lognormally distrib-
uted, and with the log-linearization of these equations, we can solve equations (20)–
(31) exactly. By exactly solving the Euler equations (25)–(26), we have successfully 
integrated international portfolio choice into a sticky-price model.
16 We have also implicitly assumed that there is a money market equilibrium condition, but we have not 
introduced separate notation for money demand and money supply, and that there is a forward market clearing 
  condition which can be guaranteed by setting      ˜ 
  
  δ     
*   = f    ˜ 
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Our focus is on the equilibrium portfolio choice of equity shares and forward foreign 
exchange position. We proceed, in this section, to construct the equilibrium solutions 
for these variables in an intuitive manner. We will first derive the portfolio demands for 
households, taking prices as given. With these in hand, we will use equilibrium condi-
tions in goods, labor, and asset markets to derive the equilibrium portfolio positions.
We rely on ex ante symmetry in the derivations below. Lower-case letters refer to 
logs of their upper-case counterparts. We use “var” to denote variance, and “cov” 
covariance.
17 We use the notation  
_
  x    = E(xt). In the linearized equations below, we 
suppress the intercept terms for convenience.
Under log-normality, the household first-order condition (25) can be written as 
−ρ cov(ct , st) + var (st)/2 = 0, where we have used ex ante symmetry to give us ft   
= 0, and E(st) = 0. We can use similar steps, and recognize that symmetry implies 
that  
__
  π     =  
__
  π    *, var(πt) = var(  π  t  *  ), and cov(st , πt) = −cov(st ,   π  t  *  ), to derive from equa-
tion (26): ρ cov(ct , πt − (st +   π  t  *  )) − cov(st , πt − (st +   π  t  *  ))/2 = 0. We approximate 
the budget constraint (15), using condition (20) to arrive at the equation which cor-
responds to equation (1) for the fully-specified model:
(35)  pt + ct = (1 − γ)(1 − ζ)πt + γ(1 − ζ)(st +   π  t  *  ) + ζ(wt + lt) + δst ,
where ζ ≡   e  
 
__
  w  + 
_
  l    /(  e  
 
__
  π      +   e  
 
__
  w  + 
_
  l     ), δ ≡    ˜ 
  
  δ  /(  e   
 
__
  π      +   e  
 
__
  w  + 
_
  l     ), and γ ≡ γf  . Here, we have approxi-
mated the budget constraint around a point where xt =  
_
  x    for xt = st , ct , πt ,   π  t  *  , wt , lt.
Using these equations, and recognizing that pt is predetermined, we solve for γ 
and δ:
(36)  γ =    
cov(πt − βπ,s st , πt −   π  t  *  )
   __________________   
var(πt −   π  t  *   − βπ−π*,s st)
    +    
ζ
  _____  1 − ζ        
cov(wt + lt − βw+l,s st, πt −   π  t  *  )
   ______________________   
var(πt −   π  t  *   − βπ−π*,s st)
    ,
where we have used the notation βx,s ≡ cov(xt , st)/var(st).
Consider expression (36). From the household’s point of view, the equity position 
is determined by the covariances and variances of shocks to profits and labor income 
that are orthogonal to exchange rates. Any variance in the portfolio that is attribut-
able to exchange rate changes is hedged through the forward position, so the equity 
position is determined only by those risks that are uncorrelated with exchange rate 
risk.
If the component of labor income that is orthogonal to exchange rates were uncor-
related with relative profits of Home and Foreign firms (or if labor’s share were zero), 
the second term in equation (36) would drop out. Then the share γ of equities held 
in Foreign firms would increase as Home profits (orthogonal to the exchange rate) 
have a higher covariance with relative Home and Foreign profits. Under our symme-
try assumption, this term will equal ½, so the portfolio would be balanced between 
Home and Foreign equities if only the first term mattered.
18 It is the second term of 
equation (36) that will determine home bias.
17 We drop the t − 1 subscript on expectations for the rest of this section.
18 This claim can be verified by noting πt = (πt +   π  t  
*  )/2 + (πt −   π  t  
*  )/2, and that the covariance of πt +   π  t  
*   with 
πt −   π  t  
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That term tells us that the share of Foreign equities will be larger the greater the 
covariance between the component of wage income that is orthogonal to exchange 
rates and Home profits relative to Foreign profits. If this covariance is positive, there 
will be anti-home bias (γ > ½), as in Baxter and Jermann (1997). In that case, returns 
to Home equities (compared to returns on Foreign equities) are positively correlated 
(conditional on the exchange rate) with labor income, so the variance of total income 
(returns to equities and human capital) is reduced by holding a relatively large share 
of Foreign equities. There is home bias when the covariance is negative. In that case, 
Home equities serve as a hedge against the component of labor income shocks that 
is orthogonal to exchange rates.
So far, to arrive at equation (36), we have only used the households’ first-order 
conditions and budget constraints, along with the symmetry assumption and the 
assumption that nominal prices are fixed. Now we can bring in one more equation 
from the rest of the economy, the linearization of the profit equation for Home firms. 
We have from (33)
(37)  (1 − ζ  )πt + ζ  (wt + lt) =   c  t  
W   +    1  __  2    st ,
where   c  t  
W   = (ct +   c  t  *  )/2.
19
Taking covariances with πt −   π  t  *   on both sides of equation (37), we get
(38)  cov aπt +    
ζ
  _____  1 − ζ     (wt + lt ), πt −   π  t  *  b =     1  _______ 
2(1 − ζ)
     cov(st , πt −   π  t  *  ),
where we have used symmetry to infer that cov(  c  t  
W  , πt −   π  t  *  ) = 0. Also,
(39)  cov aπt +    
ζ
  _____  1 − ζ     (wt + lt ), stb =     1  _______ 
2(1 − ζ)
     var(st),
using symmetry to infer that cov(  c  t  
W  , st) = 0. Dividing through by var(st ), we can 
write
 β π,s +    
ζ
  _____  1 − ζ     βw+l,s =     1  _______ 
2(1 − ζ)
     .
Substitute these relations into the right-hand side of (36) to derive γ = 0, the result 
is that there is full home bias in the equity portfolio. We can then get the equilibrium 
value of δ, when γ = 0:
(40)  δ = −    1  __  2    +    1  ___  2ρ   .
19 In deriving (37), we use symmetry to get  
_
  c    =  
_
  c   * and pt =   p  t  
*  . The Appendix (which is available on request) 
shows that pht − pt = 0, which we have used to derive (37).172  AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MAcroEconoMicS  JuLY 2009
This is the special case of equation (13) when pass-through is zero (b = 0), and when 
there is no home bias in preferences over goods (α = 0).
In Section I, we demonstrated that the complete markets allocation would obtain 
if residents in each country retained ownership of their own firms, with the appropri-
ate exchange-rate hedging instrument in place. In this section, we have derived the 
optimal allocations from the first-order conditions and market-clearing   conditions, 
and we confirm that, in equilibrium, γ = 0. It, of course, follows, since the log-
  linearized model of this section is a special case of the model of Section I, that the 
complete-markets equilibrium condition (10) will hold here.
20
Here, we can get some further intuition for why complete home bias in equity 
holdings, γ = 0, is optimal when households can hedge exchange rate risk. When 
there is complete home bias, from the budget constraint (35), we find
 p t + ct = (1 − ζ)πt + ζ  (wt + lt) + δst .
Since prices are set in advance, consumption varies only when there are changes 
in Home firm revenues, (1 − ζ)πt + ζ  (wt + lt), or changes in the returns to the for-
ward position, δst . Conditioning on the exchange rate (whose risk is hedged through 
forward contracts), there is no diversifiable consumption risk under this solution 
of complete home bias. Equation (37) tells us that the revenue of the Home firm, 
(1 − ζ)πt + ζ  (wt + lt), is determined by world consumption and the exchange rate 
(which helps determine demand for Home goods relative to Foreign goods),   c  t  
W   + st/2, 
so, after hedging the exchange rate risk, Home revenues depend only on variation 
in world consumption,   c  t  
W  , which is risk that cannot be hedged. The solution of 
complete home bias, along with the appropriate hedge in Foreign exchange markets, 
eliminates all idiosyncratic risk.
The key point is this—Home labor income and profits for the Home firm (and 
analogously for Foreign) are negatively correlated conditioning on the exchange rate. 
By the phrase “conditioning on the exchange rate,” we mean for a given exchange 
rate or holding the exchange rate constant. The availability of the forward market 
in foreign exchange allows households to hedge exchange rate risk. So the risk from 
profits and wage income that is relevant for households is the risk conditional on the 
exchange rate. For a given exchange rate, Home profits hedge Home labor income 
risk.
It is instructive to consider a particular shock. Suppose there is a positive home 
productivity shock. First, suppose there is no money supply reaction to this shock. 
Our LCP model has the special feature that   c  t  
W   + st/2 is not affected directly by the 
productivity shock. Output and revenue are demand-determined in a sticky-price 
model. In this case, the productivity shock leads to an increase in Home profits, πt , 
and a reduction in Home wage income, wt + lt , that exactly offset each other. When 
there is an increase in productivity, firms’ revenue is unchanged, so firms simply 
economize on labor. If Home households hold all of the claims to Home profits, 
20 In setting up the firms’ problem, we did not specify the discount factor used by firms to evaluate profits. But 
when markets are effectively complete, the discount factor of Home and Foreign firms are equal to each other and 
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the shock to their wage income is exactly hedged by the offsetting effect on profit 
income.
But this conclusion, that complete home bias is optimal, does not depend on the 
property of the LCP model that   c  t  
W   + st/2 is not directly influenced by the productiv-
ity shock. Indeed, suppose the monetary policy reaction function was such that the 
Home money supply increases when there is a positive Home productivity shock. 
Then   c  t  
W   and st would both increase. But that does not change the conclusion that 
complete home bias in equity holdings is optimal. The shock to   c  t  
W   is not diversifi-
able. There will be an increase in revenue of Home firms relative to Foreign firms 
because of the depreciation of the Home currency, but that is fully hedged through 
the household’s forward position. There is no diversifiable risk that the Home house-
hold can hedge by holding Foreign equities.
We have derived the complete home bias result using the nominal price stickiness 
assumption, the definition of Home profits, the budget constraint of Home house-
holds, and the two first-order conditions (25) and (26) that pertain to asset choice. 
The derivations in this subsection all arise from equations from the approximated 
versions of the two first-order conditions for asset choice, the household budget con-
straint, and the definition of firm profits. In performing the approximations, we have 
used the fact that goods prices are preset. As we noted at the end of Section I, the 
home bias result is robust to alternative assumptions. For example, the result does 
not depend on money demand arising from real balances in the utility function. 
Other specifications that maintain equations (25) and (26) will deliver the same 
result. The result does not depend on the assumptions about monetary policy. In par-
ticular, we emphasize that our result does not depend on any assumption about the 
correlation of money shocks and productivity shocks. It may be that money supplies 
respond contemporaneously to technology shocks. That policy affects the overall 
responses of employment and wages to technology shocks, but it does not affect 
the equity portfolio or the position in the forward market. The result also does not 
depend on our specification of the labor market as competitive with flexible wages. 
For example, a sticky-wage model in which employment was demand determined 
would not alter the conditions that we used in the derivation of the home bias result. 
As we have noted above, when the portfolio exhibits complete home bias in equities, 
and exchange rate changes are hedged, there is no idiosyncratic risk to income for 
households, so all consumption risk is eliminated.
The model of this section has special features relative to the more general model 
presented in Section I. The assumption of local currency pricing means that relative 
goods prices internally are not affected by shocks, because they are set ex ante. The 
real exchange rate shocks, in turn, reflect only deviations from the law of one price 
(which holds ex ante). Under LCP, when expressed in a common currency, revenues 
of Home and Foreign firms are perfectly correlated, as is apparent from equation 
(37). But the complete home bias in equities does not depend on these particular 
aspects of the LCP model.
When ρ > 1, we find δ < 0. A depreciation of Home’s currency reduces Home’s 
wealth through the exchange-rate hedge. That corresponds to the situation in which 
a country’s net position in nominal assets is short in foreign currency. This pattern is 
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bias in equity holdings among US households by appealing to the exchange-rate 
hedge discussed in this model. Intuitively, when the currency depreciates,   revenue 
from Home firms increases in Home currency terms. From (37), a 1 percent depre-
ciation leads to a 0.5 percent increase in Home revenues. With complete home bias 
in equity holdings, that increases Home consumption by 0.5 percent. Symmetrically, 
Foreign consumption falls 0.5 percent, so Home relative to Foreign consumption 
rises 1 percent. But from (10), under the optimal exchange rate hedge, Home relative 
to Foreign consumption should rise only 1/ρ percent. Hence, Home needs to short 
foreign currency when ρ > 1. In this static setting, even if we allowed for partial 
pass-through and home bias in preferences, equation (13) tells us that under plausible 
parameterizations (ρ > 1, ω ≥ 1), Home should still be short in Foreign currency.
We emphasize that while we have shown that there is an equilibrium with γ  =  0, 
we have not shown it is the only portfolio equilibrium. However, the portfolio choice 
model is fairly standard when the model is linearized, and it is easy to see that this 
equilibrium is unique as long as there are two independent sources of shocks that 
affect returns on equities and the foreign exchange hedge. Note that using the first-
order condition for money holdings (23), and the complete-markets equilibrium con-
dition (10), we find st = mt −   m  t  *  . The exchange rate depends only on relative money 
supplies. However, we allow for money supplies to be set endogenously in response 
to technology shocks. The key assumption, however, is that relative money supplies 
cannot be perfectly correlated with relative productivity shocks, there must be some 
independent monetary variation. Otherwise, the return on the foreign exchange 
hedge and on the equity portfolio would be perfectly correlated, and the optimal 
portfolio would be indeterminate.
III.  Dynamic Model
In this section, we build an infinite-horizon model, which allows us to examine 
the effects of persistent technology shocks and different degrees of price stickiness. 
Most of the assumptions are the same as in the static model. As we have explained, 
once prices can adjust, the forward exchange rate position cannot fully hedge inter-
national risk.
The price-setting rule is modified as follows. A fraction τ of firms in each 
country set prices in advance, and the rest of the firms can adjust their prices in 
each period, after the realization of shocks. This approach allows us to study the 
portfolio allocation with or without sticky prices, and we can learn how different 
degrees of price stickiness affect the portfolio. There are different types of firms in 
each country, but we assume the equities of all firms in each country are bundled 
together.
We address two important questions here. First, does price stickiness matter much 
for international portfolio choice? In a world with temporary price stickiness and 
persistent productivity shocks, one might expect the answer to be no. But we will 
show that, in fact, a small amount of price stickiness may matter. Second, how do 
persistent shocks affect the optimal portfolio? In a flexible price setting, the optimal 
portfolio is more foreign skewed than it is in the classic endowment economy case, 
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bias in our model. In the dynamic model, when the elasticity of substitution between 
Home and Foreign goods is more than unity (ω > 1), the optimal Home portfolio 
should be less home biased than it is in the static model because households must 
take into account the future, after prices have been adjusted. Nominal exchange-rate 
hedging matters for the short run when nominal prices are sticky, but cannot offer 
any real hedge in the long run when nominal prices adjust.
We have shown that we can integrate international portfolio choice into a mon-
etary model by solving the Euler equations as discussed in the static model. Our 
model exhibits stationarity in the linearized economy by replicating the real-side 
allocations of a model with a full set of nominal contingent claims, although in our 
model, we have only equities and forward contacts. As shown in the Appendix, 
Home and Foreign equities and forward contracts span the linear space generated by 
relative shocks in the linearized economy.
Sections IIIA and IIIB lay out the technical details of the model. The solution is 
presented and analyzed in Section IIIC. In Section IIID, we substitute some numeri-
cal values into our solutions to get an appreciation for the quantitative values of the 
portfolios implied by the model.
A. household problem
Home households maximize their expected utility:
  max E0   ∑ 
t=0
   
∞
      β 
tu act ,    
Mt  ___  pt
    , Ltb ,
subject to the following budget constraint:
(41)  ptct + Mt + Qtγh,t+1 + St   Q  t  *  γf,t+1
  = γh,t(Qt + Πt) + γf,t St(  Q  t  *   +   Π  t  *  ) + (St − ft)    ˜ 
  
  δ  t + Wt  Lt + Mt−1 + Trt ,
where Qt (  Q  t  *  ) denotes the price of Home (Foreign) equities. The utility function and 
consumption baskets are the same as in the static model. Households enter time t 
with money Mt−1, equities (γh,t , γf,t), and forward contracts    ˜ 
  
  δ  t . After the realization 
of shocks, households choose the consumption level, real money balances, and labor 
supply. The dividends from firms are paid at time t, and households get the payoff 
from the forward contract. They receive the transfer from the government as well. 
Finally, the households choose forward contracts     ˜ 
  
  δ  t+1 and equity holdings γh,t+1 , 
γf,t+1 , which determine the dividends households receive at time t + 1.
Our assumptions on consumption, asset acquisition, etc., follow exactly the stan-
dard presentation of the nonstochastic dynamic model (see, for example, Obstfeld 
and Kenneth S. Rogoff 1996), with one exception. We assume, as in the static model, 
that households can take a forward position in foreign exchange. Making a contract to 
buy Foreign exchange forward next period, of course, is equivalent to buying a nom-
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nominal bond denominated in the Home currency. We could have introduced nomi-
nal bonds denominated in each currency separately into the model, rather than for-
ward contracts. However, that would add nothing to our presentation. We shall see 
below that the (linearized) model, with equities and forward contracts, reproduces 
the allocation that would be achieved with trade in a complete set of nominal state-
contingent bonds. If we introduced nonstate-contingent nominal bonds instead of 
forward contracts, the position held by each household would reproduce their posi-
tion in the forward market.
The first-order conditions for the households are
(42)    
χ
  ___  Mt
   =    
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
    − Et β    
  c  t+1   
−ρ
   
  ____  pt+1
   ,
(43)  η  L   t  
ψ   =    
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
    Wt ,
(44)  Et−1 a   
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
    Stb = ft Et−1a   
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
   b ,
(45)    
  c  t−1   
−ρ
   
  ____  pt−1
    Qt−1 = Et−1 aβ    
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
    (Qt + Πt)b ,
(46)    
  c  t−1   
−ρ
   
  ____  pt−1
    St−1   Q  t−1    *     = Et−1 aβ    
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
    St(  Q  t  *   +   Π  t  *  )b.
First, let Dt,t+s ≡ (  c  t+s   
−ρ
    /pt+s )/(  c  t  
−ρ  /pt ). The no-bubble solution for equity prices 
implies that
(47)  Qt =   ∑ 
s=1
   
∞
     Et β
sDt,t+s Πt+s ,  St  Q  t  *   =   ∑ 
s=1
   
∞
     Etβ
sDt,t+s St+s   Π  t+s    *   .
Let
(48)  Vt ≡ γh,t+1 Qt + γf,t+1 St  Q  t  * ,
(49)  ht ≡   ∑ 
s=1
   
∞
     β 
sEt Dt,t+s Wt+s Lt+s ,
(50)  rt ≡    
β(Qt + Πt)
  ________  Qt−1
     ,
(51)   r  t  
h   ≡    
β(ht + Wt  Lt)
  __________  ht−1
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(52)  γt+1 ≡    
γf,t+1 St  Q  t  * 
  ________  Vt
    = 1 −    
γh,t+1 Qt  ______  Vt
    .
These are, respectively, financial wealth, human capital, the rate of return on finan-
cial wealth and human capital (each multiplied by the utility discount factor for 
algebraic convenience), and the share of foreign equity in equity portfolio.
We can rewrite the budget constraint (41) for time t:
(53)  ptct + Vt + ht = Vt−1 (1 − γt)β
−1rt + Vt−1 γt β
−1    
St  ___  St−1
      r  t  *   
  + ht−1 β
−1  r  t  
h   +    ˜ 
  
  δ  t (St − ft).
We will assume, below, a process for the money supply in which Et(  M  t+1   
−1
   ) =   M  t  
−1  . 
We note this now because, under this assumption, the first-order condition (42) can 
be simplified directly to get
(54)    
  c  t  
−ρ 
  ____  pt
    = χ  M  t  
−1   + Et β    
  c  t+1   
−ρ
   
  ____  pt+1
    =    
χ
  _____ 
1 − β
       M  t  
−1  . 
It follows from this that Dt,t+s = Mt /Mt+s . The first-order conditions for equity hold-
ings, (45) and (46), can be summarized as
(55)  Et−1 a   
Mt−1  ____  Mt
    rtb = Et−1 a   
Mt−1  ____  Mt
       
St  ___  St−1
      r  t  *  b = 1.
B. firms
Firms use the same linear technology as in the previous section. We have two 
types of firms in each country. A fraction τ of firms set the price in advance, and the 
rest set the price after the realization of shocks. The profit maximization problem of 
the Home firm with price flexibility is
  max ph,t(i)Yh,t(i) + St    p  h,t   *    (i)  Y  h,t   *   (i) − a   
Wt  ___  At
   b[Yh,t(i) +   Y  h,t   *   (i)].
Because Yh,t(i) is not a function of   p  h,t   *   (i), and   Y  h,t   *   (i) is not a function of ph,t(i), the 
problem is easy to solve:
(56)  ph,t(i) =     λ  _____  λ − 1       
Wt  ___  At
    ≡ pflex,h,t ,    p  h,t   *   (i) =     λ  _____  λ − 1       
Wt  ____  At St
   ≡   p  flex,h,t   *   ,
where pflex,h,t is the optimal price for the Home market of the Home goods produced 
by the firms that can adjust prices after they observe shocks.   p  flex,h,t   *     is the optimal 
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The other optimal prices are
(57)  ppreset,h,t ≡     λ  _____  λ − 1        
Et−1 c    ˜ 
   
  D  t    
Wt  ___  At
    a   1  ___  ph,t
   b  
−λ
   a   
ph,t  ___  pt
    b  
−ω
  ctd
    _______________________   
Et−1 c    ˜ 
   
  D  t a   1  ___  ph,t
   b  
−λ
   a   
ph,t  ___  pt
    b  
−ω
  ctd
     , 
(58)   p  preset,h,t   *     ≡     λ  _____  λ − 1        
Et−1 c    ˜ 
   
  D  t    
Wt  ___  At
    a   1  ___ 
  p  h,t  
*
  
   b  
−λ
   a   
  p  h,t  
*
  
  ___ 
  p  t  
* 
    b  
−ω
  c  t  
*  d
    _______________________   
Et−1 c    ˜ 
   
  D  t a   1  ___ 
  p  h,t  
*
  
   b  
−λ
   a   
  p  h,t  
*
  
  ___ 
  p  t  
* 
    b  
−ω
  c  t  
*  d
    ,
where    ˜ 
   
  D   is the stochastic discount factor, and ppreset,h,t is the optimal price for the 
Home market at time t of the goods produced by the firms that set prices in advance. 
Now, we can rewrite the price indexes as follows:
(59)  ph,t = [(1 − τ)  p  flex,h,t  
1−λ
    + τ    p  preset,h,t  
1−λ
    ]
1/(1−λ),
(60)  pf,t = [(1 − τ)  p  flex, f,t  
1−λ
    + τ    p  preset, f,t  
1−λ
    ]
1/(1−λ).
Since we have CES sub-utility functions, the market clearing condition can be 
obtained by equating the output with the sum of the demands for Home goods:
(61)  At  Lt =    1  __  2    a   
ph,t  ___  pt
    b  
−ω
  ct +    1  __  2    a   
  p  h,t   *  
  ___ 
  p  t  * 
    b  
−ω
  c  t  * .
While flexible-price firms will have higher profit than preset-price firms in general, 
CES sub-utility makes the aggregate profit of each country the same as before:
(62)  Πt =    1  __  2    ph,ta   
ph,t  ___  pt
    b  
−ω
  ct +    1  __  2    St   p  h,t   *    a   
  p  h,t   *  
  ___ 
  p  t  * 
    b  
−ω
  c  t  *   − Wt  Lt  ,
(63)  St   Π  t  *   =    1  __  2    St    p  f,t   *   a   
  p  f,t   *  
  ___ 
  p  t  * 
   b  
−ω
  c  t  *   +    1  __  2    pf,t a   
pf,t  ___  pt
    b  
−ω
  ct − St  W  t  
*     L  t  * .
We assume that
(64)  mt+1 = mt +   ν  t+1   
  m
   ,    m  t+1    *     =   m  t  *   +   ν  t+1  
  m*
   ,
(65)   a  t+1   
W
    = ϑW  a   t  
W   +   ν  t+1   
W
   ,    a  t+1   
r
     = ϑr  a   t  
r   +   ν  t+1  
  r
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where ϑW ∈ [0, 1], ϑr ∈ [0, 1) are degrees of persistence in world and relative technol-
ogy levels, and where the vector   ν  t  
x   (x = m, m*, W, r) is independently and identically 
distributed. We denote ln (Xt) as xt , the world variables as   x  t  
W   = (½)xt + (½)  x  t  *  , and 
the relative variables as   x  t  
r   = xt −   x  t  *  . We assume E  v  t+1   
m
     = E  v  t+1   
m*
    = (½)  σ  m  
2
   , so that   
Et(  M  t+1   
−1
   ) =   M  t  
−1,   as mentioned above. We also assume var(v 
m) = var(v 
m*) =   σ  m  
2
 , and 
cov(v 
m, v 
m*) = σm,m* , var(v
W ) =   σ  m  
2
   , var(v 
r ) =   σ  r  
2  , and cov(v
W, v 
r ) = 0. We assume 
initial symmetry between Home and Foreign. That is,   a  0  
r   = 0, and   m  0  
r   = 0.
Note, in particular, that we have not made any assumptions about the correlation 
of monetary shocks and productivity shocks. As long as there is some independent 
component to the money shocks—that is, as long as the correlation between money 
and productivity shocks lies on the interval (−1, 1)—our results go through. In 
  particular, our specification allows for an interpretation in which technology shocks,   
ν  t+1   
 W
     and   ν  t+1   
 r
    , are structural, and monetary shocks respond contemporaneously to 
technology shocks. For example,   ν  t+1  
  m
    ≡   ε  t+1   
m
     + ξ
W  ν  t+1   
w
     + ξ 
r  ν  t+1  
  r
     and   ν  t+1  
  m*
    ≡   ε  t+1   
m*
    +   
ξ
W  ν  t+1   
w
     − ξ 
r  ν  t+1   
 r
    , where   ε  t+1   
m
     and   ε  t+1   
m*
    are structural monetary shocks.
C. Solution of the Dynamic Model
To solve the model, we use approximations similar to those in the static model. 
The Appendix presents the solution to the model. There, the equilibrium is defined 
and solutions for all the endogenous variables are given. It shows that the equilib-
rium conditions are satisfied for those solutions. Here, we discuss the salient features 
of the solution.
An important feature of the solution is that we are able to replicate the allocation 
achieved when a full set of state-contingent nominal bonds are traded in the linearly 
approximated model. We have two kinds of assets (equities and forward currency 
contracts) that span the space generated by   a  t  
r   and   m  t  
r  . In that case, we have
(66)  ρ(ct −   c  t  *  ) = st +   p  t  *   − pt .
This equation, which rewrites (10) for convenience, is the familiar condition that 
arises when there is a full set of contingent claims, but in which consumer price 
levels are not equal.
21
We show, in the Appendix, that δt , the forward position in foreign exchange, and 
γt , the share of Foreign equities held in the Home portfolio, are constant over time 
and given by
(67)  δ ≡ δt =    1  __  2    a    1  __  ρ     − 1b    τ  ,
(68)  γ ≡ γt =   γ  t  
*   =    1  _______ 
2(1 − ζ)
          Λ  _____ 
Ω + Λ
     ,
21 There is a parallel to Baxter, Jermann, and King (1998). That paper hypothesizes that the portfolio choice 
(in a flexible-price model with nontraded goods) will replicate the complete market allocations. They make use of 
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where
 Λ  ≡ (ψ + 1)(ω − 1) c   1 − τ  ___________  
1 + ω(1 − τ)ψ
      +     1  ______  1 + ωψ        
βϑr  _______ 
1 − βϑr
   d ,
and
  Ω ≡    
ζ
  _____  1 − ζ         
(ψ + 1)τ
  ___________  
1 +ω(1 − τ)ψ
     .
Our formula for the optimal share can be written as γ = γ 
fLEXΛ/(Λ + Ω), where 
γ 
fLEX is the share of foreign assets in the portfolio when prices are fully flexible.
22
The share of the equity portfolio held in foreign assets, γ, is increasing in Λ and 
decreasing in Ω. In order to have home bias, or γ , ½, we need
23
(69)    
1 − ω(1 − τ)
  __________  
1+ω(1 − τ)ψ
      −      ω − 1  ______  1 + ωψ        
βϑr  _______ 
1 − βϑr
   . 0.
Notice that the condition (69) does not depend on ρ or ζ, while ζ determines the 
degree of home bias. There are intuitive explanations for how most of these param-
eters affect foreign equity demand.
As labor’s share, ζ, rises, γ falls when there is home bias, and rises when there is 
anti-home bias. The intuition is straightforward given our discussion above. When the 
short-run effects of productivity shocks that lead to a negative covariance of Home 
profits and labor income (conditional on the exchange rate) are sufficiently large that 
there is home bias, the home bias is amplified the larger is labor’s share. The benefits 
from hedging labor income risk are greater when labor’s share is greater. But when 
the long-run effects dominate, and returns to human capital are hedged by having a 
foreign-equity bias, the effect is, again, amplified the larger labor’s share.
βϑr is, in a sense, a measure of the weight the future receives in the portfolio allo-
cation decision. βϑr is large when households place a high weight on the future, and 
when the relative productivity shocks have a very persistent influence. In the extreme 
case, when all prices are sticky (τ = 1), and the future does not matter (βϑr = 0), 
there is complete home bias (γ = 0). This is just the static model we examined previ-
ously that assumed full price stickiness and placed no weight on the future.
On the other hand, if all goods prices were flexible, τ = 0, then the optimal equity 
portfolio is γ = 1/[2(1 − ζ)] . ½. This outcome is similar to the theoretical result 
obtained by Baxter and Jermann (1997)—“the international diversification puzzle is 
worse than you think.”
22 When ω = 1, the flexible price portfolio is indeterminate. The formula for γ shows this indeterminacy when 
ω = 1 and τ = 0.
23 We omit the case in which the denominator in equation (68) is nonpositive. This case can happen only if the 
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γ is decreasing in τ, when ω . 1. Increasing price stickiness leads to greater home 
bias in equity holdings, which makes sense given our discussion of how the Foreign 
exchange rate hedges risk when prices are sticky.
When ω . 1, an increase in βϑr leads to an increase in Λ, which implies a greater 
share of Foreign equities in the Home household’s portfolio. In short, the more the 
future “matters,” the larger the share of Foreign equities. In the limit, as βϑr S 1, 
the portfolio approaches the flexible price value, γ = 1/[2(1 − ζ)]. On the other 
hand, as βϑr S 0, the portfolio approaches
  γ =   1  __  2         
(ω − 1)(1 − τ)
  ____________________   
τζ + (1 − ζ)(ω − 1)(1 − τ)
      .
This latter value is precisely the level γ would take in the static model if a fraction τ 
of prices were preset.
The values of Home and Foreign equities are determined by the expected present 
discounted value of current and future profits of the firms. Would we not expect that 
the long-run effects of productivity growth on dividend growth and labor income 
growth wash out any temporary effects from price stickiness? Why would temporar-
ily sticky prices matter so much?
The answer is that when goods prices adjust, terms of trade movements play an 
independent role in hedging consumption risk for households. When the home coun-
try, for example, has a negative productivity shock, its export price rises because the 
supply of its good has diminished. The increase in the relative price of its import 
tends to soften the blow from the negative productivity outcome. Indeed, as Cole 
and Obstfeld (1991) point out, when the elasticity of substitution between home and 
foreign goods is unity (ω = 1), the terms of trade movements provide complete con-
sumption insurance without the need for any asset trade.
24
The implication for portfolio choice is that the gains in households’ utility from 
diversifying their equity portfolios are reduced by the terms-of-trade effect. The 
optimal portfolio under flexible prices exhibits bias toward foreign equities, but the 
gains (in expected utility) from diversifying the equity portfolio are small when ω 
is close to one. The terms of trade carry most of the load in diversifying risk when 
goods prices are flexible. Therefore, deviations from the optimal equity portfolio do 
not impose much utility cost when ω is close to one. But this insurance from terms 
of trade is not present when nominal prices are sticky. The terms of trade do not 
necessarily worsen with a positive productivity shock or improve with a negative 
productivity shock when nominal prices are sticky. In the short run, the asset port-
folio (equities and foreign exchange hedge) must insure against risk. In the limit, as 
ω goes to one, only the short run matters, because, in the future, when goods prices 
are expected to adjust fully, the terms of trade will ensure the complete-markets 
24 Heathcote and Perri (2008) assume ω = 1, but assume that there is investment in capital and trade only 
in equities, and find that home bias can arise even with flexible goods prices. Baxter, Jermann, and King (1998) 
emphasize the importance of elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods in a flexible price 
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allocation. Then, in the limit, the optimal portfolio is determined by the diversifica-
tion needs of the current period when goods prices are sticky.
In our model, a fraction τ of the firms have set the price in advance for a single 
period. Hold money supplies constant. The response of the cash flow of those firms 
to a relative productivity shock,      ˆ      a    t  
r  , is given by Ω, defined above.
In  the  period  that  a  shock  occurs,  a  fraction  1  −  τ  firms  adjust  their  price 
freely. The impact of a relative productivity shock on their cash flow is given by   
(ψ + 1)(1 − τ)(ω − 1)/[1 + ω(1 − τ)ψ]. The period after the shock, all firms adjust 
their prices. The expected discounted impact on cash flow from a relative productiv-
ity shock is given by [(ψ + 1)(ω − 1)/(1 + ωψ)] βϑr/(1 − βϑr). Adding the initial-
period effect to the long-run effect, we get the total effect of a one-unit change in      ˆ      a    t  
r   
on the expected discounted cash-flow of firms that are adjusting their goods price to 
be Λ, defined above.
In these expressions, to be clear, the cash flow to sticky price firms refers to the 
one period during which the measure τ firms have set prices in advance. After the 
period in which the shocks occur, all firms are flexible-price firms. Nonetheless, 
the response of cash flow among sticky price firms can be much larger than the 
discounted sum of cash flow to flexible-price firms. For simplicity, if all firms were 
initially sticky price (τ = 1), we see from these expressions that the impact of      ˆ      a    t  
r   on 
the sticky-price firms’ initial cash flow is given by (ψ + 1)ζ/(1 − ζ). But the impact 
on the present discounted value of cash flow after the period of the shock is given by 
[(ψ + 1)(ω − 1)/(1 + ωψ)] βϑr/(1 − βϑr). Although the latter cash flow is enlarged 
because it represents the cash flow over an infinite horizon, and so is multiplied by 
βϑr/(1 − βϑr), there are two other factors that work to make the effect on the cash 
flow after the initial period small relative to the initial-period effect. First, under 
flexible prices the terms of trade changes dampen the effects of productivity shocks 
on firm revenues. That channel does not exist in the initial period under sticky prices. 
So, (ω − 1)/(1+ωψ) multiplies the cash flow in Λ, but not in Ω. This works to reduce 
the effect of relative productivity shocks on Λ.
25 Second, in the initial period, firms 
do not “share” the benefit of the productivity increase with workers, so the initial 
effect when prices are sticky is multiplied by ζ/(1 − ζ).
Formally, we can evaluate the effect of increasing price stickiness on the optimal 
portfolio, γ, starting from a situation in which all goods prices are flexible (τ = 0). 
We find
    
∂γ
  ___ 
∂τ
    | 
τ=0
 = −   1  __  2        
ζ
  ______ 
(1 − ζ)
2       
1 − βϑr  _______  ω − 1     .
The limit of this derivative as ω approaches unity from above is negative infinity. 
More generally, if the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods is 
not too different than one, a small amount of price stickiness can have a large effect 
on the portfolio. In the next section, we use values of the parameters of this model 
25 This could increase the effect of relative productivity shocks on fL in the empirically implausible case that   
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from calibrated general equilibrium models in the literature and find that the amount 
of home bias implied by the model is considerable.
We note that the portfolio allocations are unaffected by monetary policy. All mon-
etary supply changes, whether they are independent monetary shocks or changes in 
reaction to productivity innovations, are hedged by the forward position. From the 
budget constraint, one can see that the optimal forward position will offset changes 
in the money supply. The equity position is determined to offset the change induced 
by shocks to technology, holding the money supplies constant. So neither the equity 
position nor the forward position is affected by monetary policy.
The comments about the forward position in the static model, at the end of Section 
II, apply here as well. The model implies an optimal forward position in which 
agents take a short position in foreign exchange.
D. calibrated portfolios
We can calibrate the amount of home bias implied by the model when an exchange 
rate hedge is present. Although the model is not realistic enough to capture some 
features of the macroeconomy, especially in that it assumes agents fully utilize the 
forward position to hedge exchange rate risk, it is still worthwhile to get a sense of 
the magnitude of home bias implied by the solution in equation (68). The share of 
the Home household’s equity portfolio held in foreign shares, γ, depends on the price 
stickiness parameter, τ; labor’s share, ζ; the elasticity of substitution between Home 
and Foreign aggregates, ω; the discount factor, β; the persistence of relative produc-
tivity shocks, ϑr; and, the elasticity of labor supply, ψ.
Following David K. Backus, Patrick J. Kehoe, and Finn E. Kydland (1992), we 
set ζ = 2/3. We follow Obstfeld and Rogoff (2003), and Paul R. Bergin (2006), and 
set ψ = 1.
In most calibrations of new-Keynesian models with nominal price stickiness, the 
expected life of a nominal price (under Calvo price setting) is calibrated to be four 
quarters.
26  Our model of price stickiness does not translate easily into the Calvo 
framework, however, where the life of a price follows a Poisson process. In our 
model, a measure τ of firms set prices for one period, and a measure 1 − τ adjust 
prices instantaneously. So the expected life of a price is τ periods. We calibrate the 
degree of price stickiness in the following way. We consider different values for τ, 
ranging from 0.05 to 1. We can then set the length of a period so that the fraction τ 
of a period equals four quarters, or one period equals 4/τ quarters. In Table 1, we 
present the equity shares we have calculated for the various values of τ.
The  estimates  of  Backus,  Kehoe,  and  Kydland  (1992)  give  us  on  quarterly 
data that the autocorrelation of relative productivity shocks is 0.855, so we set ϑr   
= (0.855)
4/τ. Likewise, the quarterly discount factor in Backus et al. is 0.99, so we 
take β = (0.99)
4/τ.
Backus,  Kehoe,  and  Kydland  (1994),  and  V.  V.  Chari,  Kehoe,  and  Ellen  R. 
McGrattan (2002) set ω = 1.5. In some real business cycles, however, the elasticity 
26 Taylor (1999) is usually cited as a source for this calibration. See, for example, Kevin X. D. Huang and 
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of substitution is even lower (see, for example, Bergin 2006; Heathcote and Perri 
2002). In Table 1, we consider a range of values for ω, from one to six, to explore the 
role of this parameter in determining the optimal equity portfolio.
Table 1 presents a grid of possible values of the portfolio, which depend on ω and 
the value of τ. The model is symmetric between Home and Foreign countries, so an 
unbiased portfolio would be γ = 0.5. When the elasticity of substitution, ω, is low, 
the portfolio exhibits a high degree of home bias in equity holdings when prices 
are sticky. For example, under the parameterization in which ω = 1.5, the portfolio 
exhibits home bias as long as at least 40 percent of firms adjust prices with a lag. 
This finding should be compared to the prediction of the flexible-price model, which 
has the strong anti-home bias of Baxter and Jermann (1997) with γ 
fLEX = 1.5. Just 
a small amount of price stickiness substantially changes the optimal portfolio, mov-
ing it in the direction of holding a greater share of home equities. That effect is even 
more pronounced for lower values of ω that have been used in the literature. For 
example, when ω = 1.1, the share of Foreign equities held in the Home equity port-
folio is only 10 percent, when as few as 55 percent of firms have sticky prices. Table 
1 illustrates the importance of the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between 
Home and Foreign goods for delivering the home bias result under sticky prices. If ω 
is as large as six, the optimal portfolio for Home households requires a bias in favor 
of Foreign equities, except in the case in which all firms have sticky prices.
Table 1—Optimal Portfolio Shares of Foreign Equities
ω = 1 ω = 1.1 ω = 1.5 ω = 2 ω = 3 ω = 6
τ = 1.00 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.22 0.31 0.41
τ = 0.95 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.27 0.39 0.57
τ = 0.90 0.00 0.05 0.19 0.31 0.46 0.69
τ = 0.85 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.35 0.52 0.79
τ = 0.80 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.39 0.58 0.87
τ = 0.75 0.00 0.06 0.26 0.43 0.64 0.94
τ = 0.70 0.00 0.07 0.29 0.47 0.69 0.99
τ = 0.65 0.00 0.08 0.31 0.51 0.74 1.05
τ = 0.60 0.00 0.09 0.34 0.55 0.79 1.09
τ = 0.55 0.00 0.10 0.38 0.59 0.84 1.13
τ = 0.50 0.00 0.11 0.41 0.64 0.89 1.17
τ = 0.45 0.00 0.12 0.45 0.68 0.94 1.20
τ = 0.40 0.00 0.13 0.49 0.74 0.98 1.24
τ = 0.35 0.00 0.15 0.54 0.79 1.03 1.27
τ = 0.30 0.00 0.18 0.60 0.86 1.09 1.30
τ = 0.25 0.00 0.21 0.67 0.93 1.15 1.33
τ = 0.20 0.00 0.26 0.76 1.01 1.21 1.37
τ = 0.15 0.00 0.33 0.88 1.11 1.28 1.40
τ = 0.10 0.00 0.47 1.04 1.23 1.35 1.44
τ = 0.05 0.00 0.73 1.24 1.36 1.43 1.47
notes: The table presents optimal portfolio share calculated from equation (68) for parameter values described 
in text. The portfolio value is calculated for various values of the elasticity of substitution, ω, and for various val-
ues of the fraction of firms that set prices in advance, τ. Portfolio shares of less than one-half (γ , 1/2) indicate 
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It is worthwhile to repeat the significance of these findings. Rather than take the 
view that this model explains home bias in equity holdings, we prefer to interpret 
this table as illustrating that the complete markets equilibrium could be replicated 
with very little equity diversification when nominal prices are sticky. But a require-
ment for that equilibrium is that households take an appropriate foreign exchange 
hedge.
IV.  Conclusion
Our model provides a general equilibrium analysis of the factors that determine 
equilibrium portfolio choice in a dynamic setting. Sticky-price portfolio balance 
models have been a staple of open-economy macroeconomics for decades, but until 
now there was no fully integrated dynamic stochastic equilibrium model. Our model 
is, we believe, a starting point. We are able to solve the model in closed form, and, 
therefore, we can provide some novel insights into the interplay between financial 
markets and the macroeconomy.
We have stressed a few of these features. First, we have demonstrated that even a 
small amount of nominal rigidity—price setting with a relatively short duration—
can dramatically alter equilibrium equity portfolios. Second, our model shows the 
role of nominally denominated assets in hedging real risks when nominal goods 
prices are sticky.
Future research may help refine the role of nominal bonds, or a forward position 
in foreign exchange, in insuring consumption risk when nominal prices are sticky. 
Here, we mention three special features of the dynamic model, and hypothesize 
how our results are affected by them. In each case, we note that the static model of 
Section I has generalized these assumptions, and that model gives us a guide toward 
how a generalized dynamic model will look.
First, in our dynamic model, we have assumed goods prices are set in the cur-
rency of the household/consumer. That is, firms in each country set two prices, one 
in their own currency for local sales and one in the currency of the importer for 
export sales. But, in fact, the currency of price setting for goods will not matter at all 
for the optimal equity portfolio. If firms set prices in their own currency (producer-
currency pricing) or indexed prices to the exchange rate, that would have the effect 
of altering the exchange-rate risk facing households. However, exchange-rate risk 
is hedged using the forward position in foreign exchange. The pricing behavior of 
firms affects the forward position of households but not the equity position—as long 
as households can freely hedge their foreign exchange risk so that the complete mar-
kets allocations are attainable.
Second, our dynamic model assumes that nominal wages are determined in com-
petitive labor markets. Suppose that nominal wages also were sticky. It is easy to 
see how households may want to diversify their equity portfolio, even with a foreign 
exchange hedge available, if wages are very inflexible. Suppose, for example, that all 
wages are set one period in advance, and prices are fully flexible. Obstfeld (2007) 
considers this case in the context of our static model. Suppose there is a positive 
productivity shock in the Home country. This will tend to lower the relative price 
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increase, because nominal wages are fixed. Profits and real wages move in the same 
direction, even holding the exchange rate constant. So, real risks are not fully hedged 
if households hold only Home, and not Foreign, equities. More generally, the amount 
of diversification of the equity portfolio required to support the complete markets 
allocation will increase when wage stickiness is introduced. With a high degree of 
price stickiness, the equity portfolio that delivers the complete-markets allocation 
may still exhibit a high degree of home bias. Recall that in the static model, when all 
nominal prices are sticky, the optimal equity portfolio exhibits complete home bias, 
irrespective of the degree of wage stickiness.
Third, our dynamic model assumes identical preferences for Home and Foreign 
households. We have seen, in the static model with complete price stickiness, that 
allowing for home bias in preferences does not alter the optimal equity portfolio. 
But more generally in the dynamic framework, home bias in preferences will alter 
the equilibrium portfolio of equities needed to deliver the complete-markets alloca-
tion. We know that when prices are flexible, home bias in preferences can influence 
the equity portfolio. This, in turn, must affect the portfolio under temporarily sticky 
prices.
As has been noted abundantly in the recent literature (see Obstfeld 2007, for 
an example), the condition that arises under complete risk sharing relating relative 
Home to Foreign consumption on the one hand, and the real exchange rate on the 
other (see equation (10)), appears to be strongly violated in the data. Our study sug-
gests that at least part of the blame for incomplete risk sharing is that the exchange 
rate positions taken by countries do not optimally share risk. That is, we suggest 
when there are sticky prices that the forward position in foreign exchange may be 
the culprit in incomplete risk sharing.
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